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ABSTRACT. Via a historical reconstruction, this paper primarily demonstrates how
the societal debate on genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) gradually extended in
terms of actors involved and concerns reﬂected. It is argued that the implementation
of recombinant DNA technology out of the laboratory and into civil society entailed
a ‘‘complex of concerns.’’ In this complex, distinctions between environmental,
agricultural, socio-economic, and ethical issues proved to be blurred. This fueled the
confusion between the wider debate on genetic modiﬁcation and the risk assessment
of transgenic crops in the European Union. In this paper, the lasting skeptical and/or
ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food biotechnology is interpreted as
signaling an ongoing social request – and even a quest – for an evaluation of bio-
technology with Sense and Sensibility. In this (re)quest, a broader-than-scientiﬁc
dimension is sought for that allows addressing the GMO debate in a more ‘‘sensible’’
way, whilst making ‘‘sense’’ of the diﬀerent stances taken in it. Here, the restyling of
the European regulatory frame on transgenic agro-food products and of science
communication models are discussed and taken to be indicative of the (re)quest to
move from a merely scientiﬁc evaluation and risk-based policy towards a socially
more robust evaluation that takes the ‘‘non-scientiﬁc’’ concerns at stake in the GMO
debate seriously.
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1. GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: A SOCIETAL
DEBATE BETWEEN SENSE AND SENSIBILITY
The societal debate about genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) has a
history of more than three decades. Initially, in the early seventies, scientists
evaluated mainly the riskiness of the then newly developed recombinant
DNA (r-DNA) technique that allowed the development of GMOs. From
then onwards, this internal questioning became a social debate that
gradually and largely extended in scope of actors involved and concerns
addressed. This extension took its most extreme form in the European
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Union (EU). Here, by 1999, a growing societal opposition towards geneti-
cally modiﬁed (GM) agro-food products contributed to the installation of a
de facto moratorium on the commercialization of new GMOs, and to the
implementation of one of the most stringent process-based regulatory re-
gimes worldwide (Devos et al., 2006).
In reference to research using large cross-European focus groups, Marris
(2001) concluded that ‘‘the public’’ generally is ambivalent about agro-food
biotechnology, because it simultaneously recognizes positive and negative
dimensions of this technology. Although the de facto moratorium was
abandoned in 2004, at present the skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of
Europeans towards GM agro-food products still holds. This is reﬂected in
the latest Eurobarometer survey, stating that ‘‘GM food is widely seen as
not being useful, as morally unacceptable and as a risk for society’’ (Gaskell
et al., 2006: 8). This lasting skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude can be
interpreted as signaling a request – and even a quest – of society for an
evaluation of agro-food biotechnology with Sense and Sensibility. In other
words, it is still searched for how to establish a move from a mere scientiﬁc
evaluation towards a socially more robust one, in which societal issues are
addressed in a more ‘‘sensible’’ way, whilst making ‘‘sense’’ of the diﬀerent
stances taken in the GMO debate (Levidow and Marris, 2001; Jasanoﬀ,
2003; Nowotny, 2003).
An important aspect lying at the basis of this (re)quest is the diﬀerence
in perception of risk between scientiﬁcally trained experts and lay people
(Slovic, 1987; Wynne, 2001; Savadori et al., 2004). Experts tend to de-
scribe risk on grounds of strictly scientiﬁcally determined standards,
whilst lay people rely on a less stringent concept of risk. In the GMO
debate, lay people widely expand the concept of risk with various con-
cerns, such as usefulness, socio-economic impacts, freedom of choice,
unnaturalness of genetic modiﬁcation, respect for nature, long-term con-
sequences, irreversibility of adverse eﬀects, democracy, disparities between
the industrialized world and the third world, uncertainties, fallibility of
experts, trust and/or sustainability of agriculture (Siegrist, 2000; Marris,
2001; Lassen et al., 2002; Shaw, 2002; Verhoog et al., 2003; Cook et al.,
2004; Frewer et al., 2004; Deckers, 2005; Madsen and Sandøe, 2005;
Lassen and Jamison, 2006). Because ‘‘the public’’ is not homogenous,
variation in risk perception also exists between diﬀerent countries and
cultures, between diﬀerent individuals within countries, and within dif-
ferent individuals at diﬀerent times and within diﬀerent contexts (Frewer
et al., 2004).
According to Slovic et al. (2004), in any perception of risk there is a
complex interplay between two ‘‘attraction poles’’ of reason and emotion.
While these two poles operate in parallel, they depend on each other. This
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complex interplay reminds us of Jane Austins novel entitled Sense and
Sensibility. Published in 1811, under the anonym ‘‘By a Lady,’’ this novel
describes the lives of two sisters, Marianna and Elinor. On the surface,
these sisters seemingly represent two opposite poles: Mariannas emotional
and romantic nature represents the cult of ‘‘Sensibility,’’ whereas Elinors
rationality represents the cult of ‘‘Sense.’’ However, just as much as the
two sisters are next of kin, their natures/characters continually co-con-
struct each other. The sisters thus symbolize a continuous and complex
process of ‘‘giving sense to sensibility,’’ in which simultaneously ‘‘sensi-
bility guides the making of sense.’’ Because of the pejorative connotation
the concept of ‘‘emotion’’ often carries (e.g., when criticism on science is
dismissed as purely ‘‘emotional’’), and because of the fact that in between
emotion and reasons many other concerns are at play, in this paper, the
metaphorical entanglement of Sense and Sensibility is used to stress the
complex interplay between the various concerns playing in the societal
debate on GMOs.
Via a compact historical reconstruction, the establishment of and
evolutions in this complex interplay are discussed. It is addressed (i) how
r-DNA technology evolved in a dynamically changing context from labo-
ratory science to society; (ii) how various socio-economic and ethical con-
cerns popped up along this change, drawing new actors in the front line of
the debate; (iii) how the expression and meaning of societal concerns
evolved; and (iv) how scientiﬁc objectives became intertwined with extra-
scientiﬁc – socio-economic/commercial – objectives. Given the deep revision
of the European regulatory frame on transgenic crops during the de facto
moratorium, it is ﬁrst investigated whether any integration of ‘‘non-scien-
tiﬁc’’ concerns in the restyled legal frame succeeded in taking the (re)quest
for Sense and Sensibility in risk analysis of GM agro-food products seri-
ously. Secondly, it is discussed how a similar restyling of science commu-
nication models led from a science literacy model towards engagement
initiatives.
2. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BECOMING PUBLIC
As argued by Ulrich Beck (1992), scientiﬁc and technological advances not
only bring along unquestioned beneﬁts, they also generate new uncertainties
and failures. Because of this, and because of an ongoing complexiﬁcation of
what is considered a contemporary risk, scientiﬁc and technological
developments have been the subject of societal controversies in various
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domains.1 These controversies are indicative of the emergence of a ‘‘reﬂexive
modernity’’ whereby there is a growing awareness about the ways in which
‘‘techno-scientiﬁc progress’’ aﬀects the interests and values of society, and
about which risks are imposed upon society. In scaling up scientiﬁc and
technological developments beyond the conﬁned limits of the laboratory,
and in testing technology as a real-world experiment, this trend has been
ampliﬁed. Techno-scientiﬁc developments are entering society more directly,
exposing it at large to potential dangers (Krohn and Weyer, 1994; Levidow
and Carr, 2007). As such, risk debates and controversies can be viewed as an
expression of contending views on how potential risks should be anticipated,
controlled, and distributed, but also on how society should be organized.
They can be seen as a reﬂection of diﬀerences in underlying values and ideals
(e.g., about the sort of environment that should be protected, sustained, or
created, the future of agriculture). Because risk analysis approaches that
form the knowledge basis for decision-making are challenged by growing
scientiﬁc uncertainties, and often fail to properly integrate societal concerns
and disputed values, Beck (1992) stated that modern reﬂexivity will lead to a
growing distrust in scientiﬁc institutions and expert systems. According to
Beck (1999), public acknowledgement of scientiﬁc uncertainties in the
practice of scientiﬁc and technological developments opens a space for
democratization and broader societal involvement. Therefore, he and others
plead for more openness, the involvement of a diversity of voices and
opinions, and for inter/transdisciplinary approaches in risk analysis (Fun-
towicz and Ravetz, 1994; Healy, 1999; Power and McCarty, 2006; Welsh
and Ervin, 2006; van der Sluijs, 2007).
As a preﬁguration of what is happening today, it is instructive to men-
tion the industrial revolution, in which the replacement of manual labor by
1 During World War I, chemical developments raised public commotion due to the use of
gases for military purposes. Strong criticism and public resistance arose with the application of
nuclear physics for military and industrial goals (culminating in the nuclear bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II), and with the use of nuclear weapons as a
dissuasive tool in the arms race during the Cold War. During the golden sixties, the growing
societal awareness of the power, the excesses and the adverse side eﬀects of scientiﬁc and
technological advances resulted in a critical attitude towards these advances as witnessed by the
ideological political and philosophical debates held on the role of science and technology in
societies. In this period, the anti-war movement against Vietnam reached its culmination.
Radical scientists created organizations like ‘‘Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political
Action’’ and the journal Science for the People in 1968. They criticized the US domestic and
foreign policies, connected capitalism to the new military-industrial complex, and promoted
‘‘science at the service of people’’ instead of ‘‘science at the service of racism, sexism or
exploitations.’’ During the Green Revolution, the productionist ideology of intensive high-input
agriculture started to face criticism due to its environmental degradation and lack of sustain-
ability. In her book Silent Spring that was published in 1962, Rachel Carson denounced the
devastating and irrevocable hazards of the use of the pesticide DDT.
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novel machinery raised huge controversy, especially among laborers. The
Luddites actions,2 for instance, not only intended to maintain living stan-
dards and conditions of labor, but also to keep access to and negotiation
power about new technologies (Schot and Rip, 1996). This illustrates that
beside risks, controversies also encompass social, economic, cultural, and
institutional dimensions. The fascination of creating artiﬁcial life (or of
‘‘playing God’’ and pushing nature beyond its limits) and the fear of its
unintended and uncontrollable consequences have found a symbolical rep-
resentation in the Frankenstein myth.3 Nowadays, this myth survives in
various GMO discourses, reﬂecting Shelleys ‘‘monster’’ as a romantic
prototype of modern biotechnology (Nielsen and Berg, 2001).
3. RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1970s
3.1. Recombinant DNA Technique in its Socio-economic Climate
In general, whereas the golden sixties provided a ﬂourishing socio-economic
climate, the seventies brought economic recession and major oil crises (1973,
1979, and 1980). This led to a strong public concern about the limited
availability of natural resources on earth and about employment.4 In this
context, the r-DNA technique was developed (Cohen et al., 1973). The
restriction enzymes of Escherichia coli, discovered by Herbert W. Boyer
(Stanford University) carried the capacity to speciﬁcally cut DNA strands.
At the same time, Stanley N. Cohen (University of California) developed a
method to remove plasmids from bacterial cells and reinsert them in other
cells. Plasmids and bacterial viruses provided vehicles (or vectors) to carry
foreign DNA into living cells. The combination of these two discoveries
enabled Cohen and Boyer to cut and splice DNA segments in desired
conﬁgurations, and to insert them in bacterial cells. This was the starting
2 The Luddites – named after their legendary leader Ned Ludd – organized various protest
actions against this mechanization process in the British textile industry in the early 1800s.
3 The scientist Victor Frankenstein and his creature are the central ﬁgures in the novel
Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus by Mary G. Shelley, published in 1818. The story tells
how Frankenstein brings to life a sewn-up mass of organs through the use of electricity,
resulting in the creation of a ‘‘monster.’’ Being rejected by humans (and not receiving the
necessary aﬀection), the creature turns against his creator and murders his relatives. After a
long pursuit between Frankenstein and his creature, Frankenstein succumbs to rage and
exhaustion. Realizing that now his own life has lost all meaning the creature commits suicide.
4 The Limits of Growth of D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. R. Randers, and W. W.
Behrens III, published in 1972, commissioned by the Club of Rome, pinpointed that economic
growth could not indeﬁnitely be supported due to the limited availability of natural resources
on earth. This publication triggered a growing environmental awareness.
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point for the r-DNA era, which made it possible to cut, splice and recom-
bine DNA of diﬀerent species, and therefore overcoming the species bar-
rier.5 This technique became known as ‘‘genetic transformation’’ or ‘‘genetic
engineering’’.
3.2. Scientists and Their Concerns at Asilomar I
From the very start, scientists themselves, working with the r-DNA tech-
nique, assessed this technique in terms of ‘‘fears’’ and ‘‘possible risks.’’ This
also was the case for the r-DNA techniques forerunner: the exchange of
DNA between micro-organisms without the use of restriction enzymes. In
1971, the American biochemist Paul Berg and his team (Stanford Uni-
versity) infected E. coli with tumor-inducing viruses. As E. coli is a com-
mon intestinal bacterium in humans, the fear was that these malign viruses
would spread more easily throughout the human body, changing cells from
a normal to a cancerous state. Potential laboratory hazards whilst working
with tumor-inducing viruses were speciﬁcally discussed by renowned
scientists such as Berg and James Watson at the Asilomar Conference
(California, US) on 24 January 1973. The discussion held paid attention
to the safety of the laboratory workers themselves, but also covered the
safety of the community living in the close neighborhood of molecular
biology laboratories. As such, ‘‘the discussion turned from consent of
the laboratory worker to informed consent of the community’’ (Krimsky,
2005: 311).
At the ‘‘Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids’’ in June 1973, the
critical attitude of scientists took a more collective turn (Krimsky, 2005).
Attendants generally stressed the need to assess the safety of r-DNA re-
search (Singer and Soll, 1973). Berg was asked to lead the newly formed
Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) in order to study the matter. In July 1974, the Committee
proposed to install a voluntary moratorium on certain types of experi-
ments as long as the hazards could not be properly evaluated or be pre-
vented (Berg et al., 1974). This call for a moratorium received media
coverage, alerting members of the public and inducing the ﬁrst public
debates on the r-DNA technique and its applications (Hindmarsh and
Gottweis, 2005). On demand of the Committee, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) established the ﬁrst Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee in October 1974.
5 Due to the (near) universality of the genetic code, foreign DNA pieces can be expressed in
about any host organism.
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3.3. Societal Concerns at Asilomar II
The Committee also requested the NAS and the NIH to organize an
international meeting of involved scientists to discuss appropriate and
concrete ways to deal with the potential biohazards of r-DNA molecules
and to review scientiﬁc progress in this research area. This conference took
place in February 1975 and is known as ‘‘Asilomar II.’’ Similar to Asilomar
I, safety issues formed the core of the discussion. Scientists feared that
‘‘microscopic Frankensteins [sic] would sneak out of the laboratory unde-
tected’’ and ‘‘would threaten public health’’ (Barinaga, 2000: 1584). They
speculated that ‘‘normally innocuous microbes could be changed into hu-
man pathogens by introducing genes that rendered them resistant to then-
available antibiotics, or enabled them to produce dangerous toxins, or
transformed them in cancer-causing agents’’ (Berg and Singer, 1995: 9011).
It was concluded that most r-DNA work should continue, but that appro-
priate safeguards in the form of physical and biological containment of the
newly created organisms should be implemented. It was, for instance,
strongly recommended to work with disabled bacteria that could not survive
outside the laboratory (Berg et al., 1975). As such, Asilomar was ‘‘widely
hailed as a landmark of social responsibility and self-governance by scien-
tists’’ (Barinaga, 2000: 1584).
However, Asilomar II went beyond Asilomar I: next to ‘‘involved sci-
entists,’’ lawyers, members of the press and government oﬃcials attended
the meeting (Berg and Singer, 1995). The inclusion of these new actors was
not the initial purpose of the so-called Molecular Biology Establishment
(Watson and Tooze, 1981), but aimed to compensate Science for the Peo-
ples criticism (see footnote 1) on the exclusion of the public (Abels, 2005).
In fact, and in contrast with Science for the People, the Molecular Biology
Establishment was not eager to share its concerns with the public: they
believed that scientiﬁc research would be blocked by lawyers and bioethicists
who neither knew nor had a real interest in their research. Still, the
‘‘intrusion’’ of non-scientists deﬁnitely enlarged the discussion.
The Asilomar II recommendations were promulgated by the NIH
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee and led to the NIH ‘‘Guidelines
for Research Involving r-DNA Molecules’’ in 1976 (Singer and Berg,
1976). To permit the involvement of the public in the establishment of
NIH guidelines, open hearings were organized (Petsko, 2002). On the one
hand, these guidelines allowed for the abandonment of the voluntary
moratorium and for resuming research. They also helped to persuade the
US Congress that legislative restrictions were not needed (Barinaga, 2000).
On the other hand, the guidelines prohibited large scale ﬁeld-testing
(Krimsky, 2005).
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4. COMMERCIALIZATION OF r-DNA BETWEEN 1976 AND 1995
From 1976 onwards, r-DNA entered the phase of commercialization. This is
related to a growing attention in Molecular Biology (before a predominantly
academic and fundamental research discipline mainly ﬁnanced by govern-
ment), to applied science ﬁnanced by private capital. The commercialization
movement was set in from university laboratories towards the private work
ﬂoor, stock market, and marketplace. It generated a change in attitudes and
research emphases: from sole scientiﬁc values, towards the inclusion of
economic values (Wright, 1986; Jasanoﬀ, 2003; Welsh and Glenna, 2006).
4.1. First Commercialization Wave
During a ﬁrst commercialization wave (1976–1981), research and develop-
ment contracts were signed between scientiﬁc academics and universities and
the private sector. Other scientists themselves became entrepreneurs and
created small biotechnology companies with private capital.6 These evolu-
tions were ﬁrst observed in the pharmaceutical sector. With the advent of
the ﬁrst r-DNA products,7 the commercial interests in biotechnology in-
creased. Pharmaceutical multinationals acquired shares in new biotechnol-
ogy companies or initiated small in-house research on r-DNA (Wright,
1986).
In addition to these evolutions, the patenting of inventions related to the
r-DNA technique entered the picture and became a source of social con-
troversy. With the Diamond vs. Chakrabarty case8 in June 1980, living
organisms engineered by man became patentable in the US. Hence, a
number of pending patent applications were issued.9 With the adoption of
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the patenting trend went into full swing: uni-
versities, companies and non-proﬁt organizations obtained the right and
incentive to hold patents on innovations arising from federally funded
6 In 1976, Boyer and the private investor Robert Swanson founded the biotechnology
company Genentech, which ﬂoats on the stock market since 1980.
7 In 1977, Genentech succeeded in using the r-DNA technique for producing the human
hormone somatostatin in bacteria. In 1978, Genentech and the City of Hope Medical Center
announced the production of recombinant human insulin.
8 Ananda M. Chakrabarty developed a Pseudomonas bacterium that was constructed to
degrade crude oil and that could be used in the treatment of oil contaminations. To protect his
invention, Chakrabarty requested a patent on the bacterium. After a ﬁrst rejection of his
demand by the Patent Oﬃce Boards of Appeals, the demand was later accepted by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.
9 The pending patent applications included one of three patents known as ‘‘the Cohen–Boyer
r-DNA cloning patents.’’ This patent was submitted in November 1974 and concerned the r-
DNA technique itself. It was the ﬁrst major patent to be issued in biotechnology (Hughes,
2001).
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research (Wright, 1986; Hughes, 2001). This augmented the attractiveness of
commercial biotechnology.
Since 1978 onwards, the use of transgenic organisms also started to be
deregulated. Although the safety issue was still under discussion in the US, it
was downplayed in favor of industrial expansion. This was supported by the
government and private sector in order to maintain leadership in biotech-
nology (Wright, 1986; Hughes, 2001). The NIH issued less stringent
guidelines for scientiﬁc research using r-DNA techniques, applying exclu-
sively to federally funded institutions (Krimsky, 2005). For the industry,
compliance to the NIH guidelines was voluntary. As such, the r-DNA
experimentations were limited to minimal physical and biological conﬁne-
ment requirements (Abels, 2005).
4.2. Second Commercialization Wave
The second commercialization wave (1981–1985) relied on the relaxation of
containment measures, but also on the adoption of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981. This Act provided tax incentives for corporate research
arrangements between universities and private sector. Commercialization
now occurred in diﬀerent forms and phases. (i) Next to pharmaceutical
multinationals, also chemical-seed and oil multinationals invested in several
biotechnology companies and funded fundamental research at universities
and research institutions. They largely invested in previously initiated in-
house research on r-DNA and/or achieved the knowledge by the acquisition
of biotechnology companies. Universities regarded patentable r-DNA re-
search as a means to generate new incomes and facilitate knowledge
translation. (ii) Biotechnology companies grew and raised capital through
public stock oﬀerings. (iii) New biotechnology companies were created
(Wright, 1986).
Various governments recognized the potential of genetic engineering and
established programs to enhance the industrial development of biotech-
nology. Like in the US, in Europe biotechnology was incorporated in na-
tional policies. In the UK, for instance, the Spinks report stimulated
fundamental research and commercial exploitation in the early eighties.
Japan declared 1981, the year of biotechnology.
The eﬀorts made by molecular biologists to develop devices for trans-
forming plants (e.g., investigation of the tumor-inducing bacterium Agro-
bacterium tumefaciens as a potential vehicle of foreign DNA into plants)
began to yield rewards (Bevan et al., 1983; Fraley et al., 1983; Herrera-
Estrella et al., 1983). With all these advances, biotechnology became an
important issue for economic competition on a national and global scale.
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Also, the commercialization wave gradually extended to the agro-food and
seed sector.
4.3. Societal Involvement: New Debates, New Developments
The commercialization of genetic engineering worldwide generated new
debates. Societal concerns regarding the safety of laboratory workers and
their neighborhood were extended to environmental aspects, consumption,
and employment. The fact that knowledge became a commodity for private
proﬁt raised questions about (i) the patentability of natural parts of life
forms, (ii) the potential adverse impacts on the access of scientists and
consumers to new developments, (iii) the hybridization between funda-
mental and applied research, (iv) the conﬁdentiality of scientiﬁc results, (v)
the moral positions and values of science and scientists, (vi) the credibility
and autonomy of scientists, and (vii) the role of the government.
Inspired by the congressional Oﬃce of Technology Assessment (OTA),10
responsible for advising policy makers and the public on the potential im-
pacts of new technological applications, Technology Assessment (TA) ini-
tiatives were adopted worldwide, focusing also on genetic engineering.
Initially, TA played a prominent role in policy by forecasting and assessing
the societal impact of genetic engineering. Later, it also initiated and
orchestrated public debates to elicit larger public participation in techno-
logical decision/policy-making, and to improve learning about new tech-
nologies and their societal concerns (Genus and Coles, 2005). As such, TA
can be considered as a way of institutionalizing societal concerns (top–
down), which previously spontaneously generated from the concerned
communities (bottom–up).
In the debate on gene technology, the traditional social partners,
employers and employees, were joined by environmental and consumer
organizations. Biotechnology also captured the attention of academics in
environmental philosophy and ethics who questioned the moral accept-
ability of this speciﬁc interference of man with his natural environment (e.g.,
playing God, sanctity of nature). At least ‘‘theoretically,’’ they attempted to
relate agro-biotechnology to ethics. In 1978, the Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee expanded to include also lawyers, ethicists, political
scientists, and consumer advocates.
The ﬁrst deliberate releases of transgenic organisms into the environment
in the eighties generated more focused discussions on their potential
environmental (agro-ecological) risks. Although it was widely acknowledged
in the seventies that GMOs would be deliberately released into the
10 Following the adoption of the Technology Assessment Act in October 1972, the OTA was
established to serve the US Congress.
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environment, their potential environmental risks were never eﬀectively
addressed. The Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations (the so-called Blue
Book) published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 1986 was the ﬁrst intergovernmental document
addressing the environmental safety of transgenic organisms. With these
evolutions, ecologists, evolutionary biologists, epidemiologists, and other
environmental specialists joined the GMO debate. The idea that environ-
mental risk assessment should be conducted stepwise on a case-by-case basis
gained adherents. The case-by-case approach considers source and target
environments, biological, and ecological characteristics of transgenic
organisms, and scale and frequency of introductions; whilst the stepwise
approach relies on an increase in complexity and realism based on the
knowledge gained during previous steps (e.g., in the laboratory) (Andow
and Zwahlen, 2006). It was recognized that classifying types of activities and
organisms into risk categories was not the most appropriate approach for
environmental risk assessments. The Blue Book and the ecological consid-
erations and recommendations about the deliberate release of GMOs of the
Ecological Society of America (Tiedje et al., 1989) contributed to the
achievement of international consensus on this case-by-case and step-
by-step procedure in environmental risk assessment.
4.4. ‘‘Bioethics’’ in Biomedicine and in the Debate on Transgenic Animals
The ﬁrst gene therapy experiments and the debate on transgenic animals
evoked concerns on human health and animal welfare, which were explicitly
labeled ‘‘bio-ethical.’’ In 1980, Martin Clines gene therapy experiment
failed.11 Subsequently, the NIH suspended Cline for having conducted an
unauthorized r-DNA experiment. This aﬀaire not just provided questions
about the riskiness of the technique itself, but also about the acceptability
and regulation of premature experiments, the possibility of irreversible
manipulations of human genes, the rights of patients, and the responsibili-
ties of medical doctors executing the experiments. With the advent of
transgenic animals (e.g., Herman the bull, Tracy the sheep) and under
strong inﬂuence of animal welfare organizations in some countries (e.g., the
Netherlands, Denmark), animal welfare became an important source of
societal controversy. Objections not only related to the possibility of neg-
ative consequences for health and welfare of the modiﬁed animals, but also
11 In 1980, Martin Cline conducted r-DNA transfer into the bone marrow cells of two
patients with hereditary blood disorders. He did so in direct opposition to the NIH gene therapy
guidelines and without the approval of the Institutional Review Board at the University of
California, where the research was conducted.
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to the direct ‘‘unnatural’’ intervention in the genome of animals as it aﬀects
their integrity (De Vries, 2006).
These developments entailed three trends in the ‘‘institutionalization of
ethics.’’ First, the established network of local, hospital, and academic re-
search ethics committees were centralized and came under state control.
Ethical committees were composed of professionals in medical and life
sciences, law, religion, and philosophy. Second, national centralized bio-
ethics committees were created, which were in charge of considering ethical
implications in biomedical research in general (including ethical aspects of
biotechnology). Third, regulations were implemented, encompassing moral
and ethical principles (Lindsey et al., 2001).
With the increased media attention on bioethical issues, the ethical dis-
course took a central role in the societal debate on biotechnology. This was
ampliﬁed by the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep in 1996 and the various
statements prohibiting human cloning.
5. RESTYLING THE EU LEGAL FRAME ON GM CROPS
Since the end of the eighties, genetically engineered agro-food products
physically entered the public sphere. This trend was ﬁrst observed in the US,
and rapidly spread to Europe. Whereas initially, GM crops were restricted
to and conﬁned in research and development laboratories, they now gained
presence in agricultural ﬁelds, in supply chains and – to a lesser extent – on
supermarkets shelves and on consumers plates.
5.1. Societal Commotion Revealing a ‘‘Complex of Concerns’’
In the US, the advent of GM agro-food products caused little public con-
troversy (Winickoﬀ et al., 2005). However, in European civil society, the
physical entrance of GM agro-food products in the public sphere enriched
the ongoing debate with new actors and concerns.
In April 1996, the ﬁrst shipments of transgenic soybean and/or maize
grown in the US were blockaded by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Under inﬂuence of both intensive NGO campaigns and growing
media attention, consumers boycotted GM agro-food products. To respect
the preferences of consumers and to maintain their conﬁdence in product
quality, major supermarket chains excluded GM ingredients from their
own-brand food products. The food industry adopted negative labeling to
guarantee the absence of GM material in foodstuﬀs. Retail food chains
launched bans against products from animals reared on feed produced from
GM crops (Levidow and Bijman, 2002).
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Reinforced by the growing societal anti-GMO sentiment, the safety
assessment of GM agro-food products evoked serious regulatory-expert
disputes between safety assessment bodies (Levidow, 2001). Conﬂicting
positions were at play about (i) the kinds of harm to assess or to ignore, (ii)
the baseline of comparison to use for assessing the severity and acceptability
of harm, (iii) the reliability of scientiﬁc evidence, and (iv) the means of
managing uncertain risks (Carr, 2002). Several Member States (MS) deﬁned
‘‘harm’’ in broader ways than some of the involved EU institutions. Hereby,
they invoked national ‘‘safeguard clauses’’ to provisionally restrict or pro-
hibit the use and/or sale of authorized GM agro-food products on their
territory. Also various NGOs urged to take broader precautionary ac-
counts, for instance, by linking ‘‘harm’’ to a discourse about ‘‘sustainabil-
ity.’’ They emphasized that judgments about the acceptability of impacts not
only should be based on conventional farming, but also on organic or
integrated farming in order to strike a new balance between agricultural
production and biodiversity (Levidow et al., 2005). In this context, GM
agro-food biotechnology was perceived as aggravating the problems of
intensive agriculture, and as bringing unpredictable, uncontrollable, invol-
untary and unfairly distributed risks (Levidow and Carr, 2007).
Some scientists, regulators, and NGOs started to question the domina-
tion of biotechnologists in regulatory and expert arenas, as well as the
appropriateness of small-scale, short-term, and strictly conﬁned ﬁeld trials
in forecasting risks under real agro-ecological situations over a longer time-
frame. Public suspicion towards scientists, policy makers, industry, and GM
agro-food products was nourished by a number of events, such as the
objections made by UKs Prince Charles, the scientist Arpad Pusztai
announcing on British television that rats fed with GM potato – modiﬁed to
express snowdrop bulb lectin – suﬀered adverse health eﬀects, and a series of
food safety scandals. Increased media coverage reﬂected the bold rhetorical
and metaphorical risk discourses of both GMO opponents and proponents,
which further intensiﬁed the debate. Emphasizing the dangers of and even
the ‘‘immorality’’ of transgenic agro-food products, the image of Fran-
kenstein has been and today continues to be widely used as a metaphor in
the GMO debate. It is a strong metaphor, which sidesteps rational argu-
ments, whilst creating and evoking images that echo existing cultural nar-
ratives, in this case possibly inviting strong emotional responses against
biotechnological developments (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Schuurman
et al., 2006). As such, the mass media explicitly got enrolled in public per-
ception and societal image building of biotechnology, leading to the social
ampliﬁcation of risk (Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996).
Before, the GMO debate mainly had been framed as an objectivist risk
issue, i.e., concerns that fell outside the scope of the risk discourse were
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dismissed on grounds that they were not scientiﬁc. However, gradually,
more and diﬀerent ethical and socio-economic concerns entered the debate.
In France, for instance, anti-globalization leaders reframed the debate as an
issue on food quality whereby topics such as paysan expertise, cultural
homogenization, and globalization were given speciﬁc attention (Heller,
2002). Questions also arose about the agronomic and socio-economic rele-
vance of transgenic crops, their usefulness and sustainability, the wanted
type of food and agriculture, the standardization of food, and the concen-
tration of biotechnology companies. According to these anti-globalists,
agro-biotechnology undermines less-intensive agricultural methods and high
quality products, and represents a threat of greater farmer dependence on
biotechnology companies (Levidow and Carr, 2007). Because of the
destruction of various experimental ﬁeld trials all over the EU and the
resulting court cases, and because of governmentally funded participatory
exercises, the GMO debate also became a local political issue, covering
issues such as the legitimacy of civil disobedience, and the function and
independency of public research (Bonneuil et al., in press). Moreover, whilst
minor crops and engineered traits remained largely ignored, the fact that the
worldwide growing area of GM crops only covered a few commercially
important crops and traits was connected to the dominance of the private
sector in research, development, and commercialization of transgenic crops,
the increased alignment of universities with the private sector, and the
general decrease in crop diversity (Welsh and Glenna, 2006). Also the high
regulatory costs and hurdles were referred to as blocking factors for the
commercialization of transgenic crops by academic and governmental re-
search institutions and small biotechnology companies (Bradford et al.,
2005).
And more issues have emerged in the GMO debate. The co-existence
between cropping systems and the adventitious mixing of GM and non-GM
agro-food products became much discussed topics (Levidow and Boschert,
in press). According to the co-existence policy in the EU, the ability of
farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic, or GM
crop production should be ensured, without excluding any agricultural
option (Devos et al., 2005). In practice, however, not only did various actors
perceive GM crops as a threat to other crop productions and even to eco-
logically sensitive regions (Verhoog et al., 2003; Altieri, 2005), also an
impressive number of ‘‘GM crop free zones’’ were created all over the EU
and a ‘‘network of GMO-free regions’’ was installed. With the creation of a
network of GMO-free regions, regional and local governments and
municipalities and farmers that were muted in the GMO debate forged
coalitions and succeeded in putting their prerogatives (including their sov-
ereignty) on the agenda. By banning GM crops on their territory, they are
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defending a speciﬁc model of future agriculture against the current agro-
industrial model: i.e., the post-productivist or sustainable rural development
model (Marsden and Sonnino, 2005).
To ensure the co-existence between cropping systems, national and/or
regional authorities now are developing legal co-existence frames in which
various on-farm management measures are set (e.g., Devos et al., 2004,
2005, 2007), and in which liability provisions for economic damage are
assigned.12 However, this appears to be an extremely diﬃcult task. Pre-
liminary assessments of these legal proposals have already conﬁrmed that
certain cropping systems are often favored over others (European Com-
mission, 2006). Also the tolerance threshold13 for the unintentional or
technically unavoidable presence of authorized GM material in non-GM
products captured important criticism, especially by organic growers who
plead for a zero tolerance instead of a tolerance currently set to 0.9%. In
contrast, proponents claim that co-existence is feasible, but that opponents
use it as a pretext to place new barriers on the path of GM crops. Hence, the
previously unsolved conﬂicts over GM crops condensed onto co-existence,
which became another arena for contentious values and ideals.
All these evolutions reveal a ‘‘complex of concerns’’ that largely exceeds
the safety issues under discussion at the Asilomar conferences. In this
complex, any distinctions between environmental, agricultural, and socio-
economic issues prove to be blurred, fueling the confusion about the wider
debate about genetic modiﬁcation and the risk assessment of GM crops in
the EU.
5.2. Restyling of EU Legislation as a Response to Societal Commotion
Since the nineties, a harmonized process-based regulatory frame for GM
crops destined for food, feed, cultivation, import, industrial processing, and
experimental uses is installed in the EU.14 The use of GM agro-food
products is subjected to a risk analysis prior to use, consisting of risk
assessment and risk management. In risk assessment, potential adverse
impacts associated with a speciﬁc activity are scientiﬁcally characterized,
whilst in risk management, policy alternatives to accept, minimize, or reduce
12 Due to a lower market price, labeling mixed products can cause a loss of income.
13 A tolerance threshold refers to the maximum admixture level for GM content under which
the co-mingled product does not have to be labeled as consisting of, containing, or being
produced from a GMO.
14 In 1986, the US Oﬃce of Science and Technology Policy issued the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. Within this context, the American government
decided that GMOs must be regulated under existing legislations, resulting in a product-based
approach. Unlike the situation in the EU, in the US, GMOs thus are subjected to stricter rules
only when the end products are not substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts.
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the characterized risks are weighed and, if needed, appropriate prevention
and control options are selected.
Despite the existence of this regulatory frame, the opposition towards
GM agro-food products grew and contributed to a de facto moratorium
hindering the commercialization of new GM agro-food products in the EU.
At the June 1999 meeting of the Environmental Council, Austria, Denmark,
France, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg decided not to accept new market
consents of new GM crop events as long as the existing regulatory frame
was not revised. Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and
the Netherlands did not go as far, but stated that they would take more
precautionary accounts for the assessment of new market consents
(Winickoﬀ et al., 2005).
From this period onwards, a reorientation took place. Via various waves
of institutional reforms, a gradual revision of the existing legislations and
the creation of new EU institutions were devised in order to restore public
and market conﬁdence (Devos et al., 2006). In response to the societal
concerns about harmfulness and scientiﬁc uncertainties related to GM agro-
food products, various scientiﬁc and technical reforms were made at the
level of the risk analysis: (i) the environmental risk assessment was diﬀer-
entiated from the product-speciﬁc ones (e.g., foods and feeds), (ii) risk
assessment methodologies and approaches were harmonized, and (iii) new
institutions such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) were
created to provide ‘‘independent, objective and transparent’’ science-based
advice. A more streamlined and less cumbersome authorization procedure,
centralized around the EFSA, was introduced through the ‘‘one door, one
key’’ approach. Hence, the societal demands that focused on the availability
of safe GM agro-food products for consumers, and the protection and
maintenance of the environment and its biodiversity were taken seriously in
the new regulatory frame. In terms of ‘‘labeling,’’ ‘‘traceability,’’ ‘‘co-exis-
tence,’’ and ‘‘public information,’’ legal answers were formed to the general
desire of the public for more information about GM agro-food products,
and the speciﬁc demand to respect the consumers and farmers freedom of
choice (Brom, 2000; Mepham, 2000).
In the restyled European regulatory frame on GM agro-food products,
two legal ‘‘openings’’ have been created, which were explicitly labeled as
ethical. First, the consultation of an ethics committee for ethical issues of a
general nature is allowed during the authorization procedure. Second, the
labeling of GM agro-food products is imposed when the presence of GM
material gives rise to ethical or religious concerns. The precise meaning of
these concerns is not further clariﬁed. Nevertheless, since nowadays the sole
use of genetic modiﬁcation is already a suﬃcient reason to justify labeling,
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ethical and religious concerns of consumers indirectly have been taken
seriously.
Also various implicit links to ethics can be revealed in the new regulatory
frame. For instance, the ‘‘precautionary principle’’ was explicitly adopted in
2002 as a way to cope with scientiﬁc uncertainties in risk analysis. This
involved (i) the enlargement of the scope of the environmental risk assess-
ment with direct, indirect, immediate, delayed, and cumulative long-term
adverse eﬀects, (ii) the need to render value judgments and the limitations of
risk assessment more explicit, (iii) the mandatory adoption of precautionary
measures such as environmental post-market monitoring and traceability,
(iv) the phasing out of certain antibiotic resistance marker genes with clin-
ical relevance, (v) the strengthening of the duty of re-examination of risk
analysis by limiting the duration of market consents to maximum 10 years,
and (vi) ﬁnally, also the consultation of members of the public became
mandatory in the authorization procedures.
5.3. Restoring Public and Market Conﬁdence
Based on the legal changes discussed above, one could conclude that de facto
moratorium gave room to a broader discussion, adding a societal dimension
to the existing regulatory frame. However, the various institutional reforms,
although leading to the upheaval of the de factomoratorium in 2004, did not
dissipate the societal disjuncture. As Gaskell et al. (2006: 19, 28) put it, ‘‘the
new regulatory frame appears to have done little to allay the European
publics anxieties about agro-food biotechnology,’’ and ‘‘the years of con-
troversy have led many people in Europe to believe that anything that has to
do with GM food is undesirable.’’ Despite institutional reforms, the lasting
skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude towards GM agro-food products re-
veals that there is a long way to go in order to restore public conﬁdence in
scientists, policy makers, and regulatory institutions. Even more, today, a
(technological) stigma seems attached to agro-food biotechnology, espe-
cially to its resulting GM agro-food products. A stigmatization of agro-food
biotechnology is supported by its invisible and potential dangers, the
repulsive (Frankenstein) images unleashed in the public sphere by various
NGOs, their origin in the chemical industry, unclear responsibilities in case
of environmental damage, scientiﬁc uncertainties and ignorance related to
cumulative long-term adverse eﬀects, their frequent occurrence in the news
through reports of contamination, etc. Being ‘‘labeled’’ as blemished and
tainted under a ‘‘Frankenfood’’ banner, the combined riskiness, undesir-
ability, and unnaturalness of these products as a whole (as an ‘‘icon’’), are
pinpointed (Gregory et al., 2001; Kasperson et al., 2001). All this not only
aﬀects the dominant ‘‘image’’ of biotechnology in general and GM
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agro-food products in speciﬁc in the public sphere, but also marks the
strategic, ﬁnancial, and market driven decisions in academic and private
research.
According to various researchers, public and market conﬁdence may be
restored by clarifying and accommodating diﬀerent values and ideals held in
decision-making, enhancing public accountability, democratizing expertise,
and by creating a shared responsibility for decision-making (Healy, 1999;
Levidow and Marris, 2001; Wynne, 2001; Jensen and Sandøe, 2002; Mayer
and Stirling, 2002; Jasanoﬀ, 2003; Jensen et al., 2003; Frewer et al., 2004;
Wandall, 2004; Deblonde and du Jardin, 2005; Genus and Coles, 2005;
Winickoﬀ et al., 2005; Irwin, 2006; Jensen, 2006; Power and McCarty,
2006). Although gaining trust may be harder than losing it, in the regulatory
process of decision-making about GM agro-food products, this objective
can be achieved by (1) making scientiﬁc risk assessments more transparent
by denoting explicitly the factual and normative premises on which they are
based, (2) allowing the contribution of diverse publics through the organi-
zation of participatory exercises, and by (3) implementing an integral sus-
tainability evaluation that integrates societal concerns. The question is how
these recommendations are implemented in the European regulatory frame
on GM crops and translated in the regulatory practice of decision-making.
5.3.1. Making scientiﬁc risk assessments more transparent
In daily practice, several MS continue to raise safety objections and thus to
dissent from the scientiﬁc opinions of the EFSA. Subsequently, decision
proposals of the EC gain little support from MS. These trends recently en-
tailed a policy shift towards greater transparency about scientiﬁc uncertain-
ties, plural viewpoints and about value judgments in risk assessment of GM
agro-food products (European Food Safety Authority, 2006; Levidow, 2006).
With this shift and with the explicit adoption of the precautionary principle, it
was recognized that risk assessment can be limited by a degree of scientiﬁc
uncertainty, ignorance, indeterminacy, ambiguity, and inconclusiveness, and
that decisions must be made acknowledging that these shortcomings may not
be resolved (van der Sluijs, 2007). Moreover, it was accepted that scientiﬁc
expertise should be pluralized in risk assessment in order to render more
explicit which value judgments about the acceptability of harm are at play,
and to take into account the permanent interplay between risk assessment and
risk management. That risk assessments conducted by various European and
national expert committees often give diﬀerent outcomes is illustrative of the
fact that various interpretations are given, values and ideals held, institutional
cultures detained, and precautionary accounts taken. For example, Austria
and Germany, respectively, take organic and integrated farming as a nor-
mative baseline for the evaluation of adverse eﬀects, instead of conventional
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farming. This leads to divergent estimates of risk between diﬀerent MS and
EU institutes. This very choice alone illustrates that risk assessment does
incorporate value and policy judgments: normative priorities set by risk
managers dictatewhich thresholds, methodologies, and working assumptions
should be used in conducting risk assessment (Levidow and Marris, 2001;
Wynne, 2001; Jensen et al., 2003; Wandall, 2004; Levidow et al., 2005;
Winickoﬀ et al., 2005; Haller and Gerrie, 2007; van der Sluijs, 2007).
Rendering these choices and their implications more explicit may be one step
forward in the establishment of a transparent, modest, and pluralistic
expertise in contested risk situations, enabling riskmanagers to judge whether
the factual basis of risk assessment is suﬃciently reliable to act upon (Jasanoﬀ,
2003; Nowotny, 2003). Still, once value judgments have been made clear, it
remains to be seen how they will be dealt with in practice. They certainly will
not make things less complicated and may even lead to new challenges. In-
deed, how will risk managers set up their practice if they can no longer work
with straightforward opinions? There is also the concern that an explicitation
of expert disagreement, subjectivity, and policy inﬂuence may further reduce
public credence in a science-based policy (Levidow, 2006; van der Sluijs,
2007).
5.3.2. Allowing the contribution of diverse publics
The possibility to consult both members of the public and an ethics com-
mittee during the regulatory procedures for marketing, allows attempts to
democratize and further pluralize expertise in decision-making. It also en-
ables risk managers to consider divergent interpretations of scientiﬁc
uncertainties and of the underlying values and ideals held by diﬀerent ac-
tors. Even more, the public seems to be more inclined to accept decisions if
consultations can be seen as ‘‘fair’’ and ‘‘balanced,’’ even when outcomes are
at odds with their preferences. However, in practice, the role of public
participation and/or ethical consultation is at best symbolic. Generally, only
scientiﬁc and technical comments are considered during the public consul-
tation, whilst larger societal concerns are excluded beforehand (Mayer and
Stirling, 2002). Hence, societal demands falling outside the scope of the risk
discourse continue to be dismissed on grounds that they are not scientiﬁc.
Moreover, the ethical assessment is not even supposed to stop or delay the
authorization procedure or to change the decision content (Jensen et al.,
2003; Madsen and Sandøe, 2005). Practical problems in making direct
public engagement and the inclusion of societal concerns in decision-making
workable can be invoked as causes (Karlsson, 2003; Myhr and Traavik,
2003; Genus and Coles, 2005; Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006; Irwin, 2006;
Beekman and Brom, 2007). It may also reﬂect the diﬃculty to fully coincide
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narrow and stringent legal frameworks with complex, large, and often
ﬂuctuating ethical concerns.
In addition to this mere symbolic presence of public participation in
market decisions on GM agro-food products, labeling provisions limited the
involvement of citizens in decision-making to consumers involvement. The
sole political power of citizens is ‘‘to buy or not to buy’’ GM-labeled
products that are on the market. This narrowed ‘‘ethics’’ to the private/
individual sphere. Also, intrinsic moral concerns of people perceiving GM
agro-food products as ‘‘unnatural,’’ as ‘‘a violation of the sanctity of spe-
cies,’’ as ‘‘disrespectful for nature’’ or as ‘‘incompatible with organic
farming’’ remain unaddressed in decision-making (Brom, 2000; Streiﬀer and
Hedemann, 2005; Streiﬀer and Rubel, 2004). When people reject GM food,
they are expressing ‘‘unease at the prevalent direction of the agro-food
system, which remains beyond democratic control; they can see no political
means to inﬂuence decisions’’ (Levidow and Marris, 2001: 352). With the
adoption of a co-existence policy, the wider debate about the acceptability
of GM crops further shifted to the private/individual sphere: farmers are in
charge of deciding whether they want to cultivate authorized GM crops or
not. Hence, one can conclude that the concept of ethics remains little ex-
plored in the regulatory process of decision-making.
5.3.3. Implementing an integral sustainability evaluation
An integral sustainability evaluation may be helpful in recovering public
and market conﬁdence, as it integrates larger societal concerns by placing
agro-food biotechnology in the context of a whole agricultural system. As
described earlier, the assessment of transgenic agro-food products has
intersected with a wider debate about ‘‘sustainable agriculture’’ in the EU,
blurring any distinctions between environmental, agricultural, and socio-
economic issues. With such an integral sustainable evaluation, deﬁning and
integrating the underlying values at stake, trading possible risks against
beneﬁts, comparing technological alternatives, testing the usefulness of
transgenic crops, and assessing a whole agricultural system become possible.
It may promote ﬁnding a better balance between agricultural production
and biodiversity, and evolving towards a socially more robust risk analysis.
Nowadays, the EU regulatory frame does not allow considerations of
potential beneﬁts and socio-economic issues in the risk analysis of GMOs.
Legal objectives mainly aim at (i) creating an internal market, (ii) ensuring a
high level of protection of human health, animal health, and the environ-
ment, (iii) enabling consumers and farmers to exercise eﬀectively their
freedom of choice in the market place, and (iv) not misleading consumers
and users (Devos et al., 2006; Jensen, 2006). There is no legal room to
evaluate whether GM crops fulﬁll wider socio-economic and environmental
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aspirations, and thus to evolve towards a sustainability assessment. More-
over, linking the use of the precautionary principle to the ideal of sustain-
able development seems to be hampered, as its use is kept within a narrow
scientiﬁc context (Deblonde and du Jardin, 2005; Levidow et al., 2005).
To conclude, although diﬀerent legal changes have been made and at
least on a general level several societal concerns have been implemented, the
controversy about and stigma on transgenic agro-food products still hold.
With the solidiﬁcation of a risk-based policy in the restyled regulatory
frame, decision-making in fact only poorly integrates societal concerns and
diﬀering values at play in the GMO debate. In principle, decision-making
relies on risk analysis, in which wider ‘‘non-scientiﬁc’’ concerns are reﬂected
(Madsen and Sandøe, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007). In practice, decision-
making continues to be solely based on risk assessment, although it is widely
acknowledged that objective scientiﬁc and technical knowledge is only one
part of risk analysis. Due to the safety objections raised by some MS, a
qualiﬁed majority is rarely reached at the Council of Ministers. As a last
resort, it is the EC that is in charge of decision-making to avoid the legal
gridlock. In this decision-making phase, the EC generally follows the
favorable scientiﬁc opinion of the EFSA. As such, only ‘‘reasonable’’ soci-
etal concerns entering the risk framing are considered in risk analysis, whilst
the remaining ones are dismissed. Even within risk assessment, it has been
argued that scientiﬁc uncertainties are poorly integrated and that value
judgments are made by experts in ways that are not transparent, both
reinforcing the notion that expert advice would be value-free and neutral
(Levidow, 2006). Hence, the gap between scientiﬁc and social rationality
seems to be maintained: ‘‘social movements raise questions that are not
answered by the risk technicians, and the technicians provide answers that
miss the point of what was asked and what is feeding public anxiety’’
(Finucane and Holup, 2005: 1604). Altogether, this reﬂects the ‘‘inherent
limitations to the practical usefulness of risk assessment in policy disputes’’
(Freudenburg, 1996: 44; Levidow et al., 2005). While decision-making is
evidence-based, social decision-making is not similarly constrained (Power
and McCarty, 2006). For these reasons, the Sense and Sensibility (re)quest to
move from a merely reliable risk-based policy towards a socially more ro-
bust one – in which normative premises are denoted explicitly and in which
diﬀering values and ideals held are accounted for in decision-making – is still
very much alive. Knowledge used for decision-making should not only be
excellent from a scientiﬁc and technical point of view, but also needs to be
socially robust (Levidow and Marris, 2001; Jasanoﬀ, 2003; Nowotny, 2003).
In the words of Beck, ‘‘scientiﬁc rationality without social rationality re-
mains empty, but social rationality without scientiﬁc rationality remains
blind’’ (Beck, 1992: 30).
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6. RESTYLING SCIENCE COMMUNICATION
The continuing controversy about GM agro-food products can be inter-
preted as an expression of the diﬃculty of policy measures to meet and
appease societal concerns. That societal concerns are complex is reﬂected in
the restyling of science communication models, in which models have in-
creased in complexity and reﬂexivity to cope with the skeptical and/or
ambivalent attitudes towards agro-food biotechnology. However, also here
a better understanding of values underlying perceptions of risk, and the role
of the media in framing the GMO issue in the public sphere is needed. A
deeper insight into public attitudes and their role in the dynamics of the
GMO controversy may ultimately improve decision/policy-making.
6.1. ‘‘Science Literacy’’ or ‘‘Deﬁcit’’ Model
The movement that relied on the ‘‘science literacy’’ or ‘‘deﬁcit’’ model
played an important role in the public communication and understanding of
science and technology. The overriding discourse in the late eighties and
early nineties was that public concerns about biotechnological developments
stemmed from either an incorrect understanding of this technology or a lack
of scientiﬁc literacy/knowledge (Logan, 2001; Gross, 1994; Wynne, 2001).
Public attitudes often were depicted as subjective, emotional, hysterical,
unscientiﬁc, and as false risk perceptions (Freudenburg, 1996). In that vein,
the public was perceived as a national unity of lay people with variable levels
of scientiﬁc literacy (Horst, 2007). Since a higher level of scientiﬁc literacy
was thought to improve public support of science and its technological
applications, more and better communication of scientiﬁc facts was assumed
to be the appropriate answer to dissolve societal concerns (Bodmer, 1985).
In other words, ‘‘knowing science’’ was ‘‘to approve of science.’’ In this
perception, the task of the media is to transmit the ﬁxed scientiﬁc facts from
the scientists world towards lay people, and should this unidirectional
information ﬂow be obstructed from educating them, then the sensationalist
tendencies of the media are said to be blamed (Wynne, 1995). For this
reason, the media have been represented as a ‘‘dirty mirror,’’ located in
between science and the public (Dornan, 1990; Bucchi, 1998). The concept
of science as ‘‘pure or objective discovery’’ has political and ethical conse-
quences: when science is given a monopoly on truth, no fundamental
questions or doubts about the direction of scientiﬁc research, technological
applications, or implementations in social or medical policy are to be settled.
The main aim is emancipation, leaving neither room for societal TA, nor for
any re-moralizing of social life. As such, it is a debate about ‘‘facts,’’ not
about any kind of ‘‘ethics.’’
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6.2. ‘‘Science Literacy’’ or ‘‘Deﬁcit’’ Model Tackled by …
In the mid nineties, several disciplines criticized the characterization of
societal concerns as a deﬁcit in scientiﬁc knowledge. Risk communication
studies and survey analyses on the public understanding of science have
revealed that although more knowledgeable people generally tend to be
more positive about science and technology, they also tend to be more
concerned and ambivalent regarding contentious research areas (Evans and
Durant, 1995; Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996; Lo¨fstedt and Frewer, 1998;
Frewer et al., 2004).
Communication science and media studies added that communication
eﬀects are not linear, and that the interpretation of information – including
scientiﬁc ‘‘facts’’ – occurs in a certain social, political, economic, or ethical
context. As a result, a simple information transfer will not lead to homo-
geneous attitudes or behavior. Moreover, the content of information may
suﬀer from its transfer from one context to another (McQuail, 2006), since
information is both constructed and transformed in the communication
process (Bucchi, 1998).
Sociologists of science attributed the cause of societal concerns to a
deﬁcit in sociological knowledge. They argued that credibility and trust
should not be considered as intrinsic properties of information. On the
contrary, they depend on social solidarity and on processes of social iden-
tity-construction (Wynne, 1992; Irwin and Wynne, 1996): people experience,
deﬁne and judge the usefulness and relevance of scientiﬁc knowledge in their
social life. Therefore, the public should be viewed as composed of locally
situated groups, each of which makes sense of scientiﬁc knowledge in its
own way. ‘‘When viewed in their local contexts, particular instances of
sense-making, previously characterized as deﬁcient, now seem perfectly
reasonable’’ (Horst, 2007: 152).
6.3. ‘‘Public Engagement with Science and Technology’’
The ‘‘public engagement with science and technology’’ movement, emerging
at the end of the nineties introduced a ‘‘new mood for dialogue.’’ Focus was
not only put on institutionally oriented top-down processes, but also on the
bottom-up sense-making processes of people (Maeseele, 2007). On the one
hand, the movement set forth the various forms of engagement that people
may have with science and technology. For this reason, public support may
only be retrieved by recognizing and respecting publics attitudes and values,
and by weighing them along with scientiﬁc factors. On the other hand,
institutions should respond to the peoples demands through greater
transparency, openness, and public participation. To ensure the socially
accountable development of transgenic agro-food products, various
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engagement initiatives (e.g., consensus conferences, participatory TA ini-
tiatives, citizens panels) so far have been organized. However, in the face of
a much debated demand for a cultural change in key decision-making and
scientiﬁc institutions, these participatory initiatives seem to be only isolated
events with limited public visibility and ability to shape the trajectory of GM
legislation and development (House of Lords, 2000; Genus and Coles, 2005;
Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006). The focus should be both on the software of
engagement (values, codes) and on the hardware (participation procedures)
(House of Lords, 2000; Wilsdon and Stilgoe, 2005). Nevertheless, it remains
to be seen whether similar governmental discourses merely represent a dis-
cursive shift or, on the contrary, a genuine epistemological shift at public
policy level (Irwin, 2006). Otherwise, this ‘‘talking the talk without walking
the walk’’ would be quite similar to the higher mentioned rather symbolic
participation in the restyled EU regulatory frame.
CONCLUSION
Like the intricate web of Sense and Sensibility, described in Austens novel,
the societal debate on GMOs presents itself as a continuous and complex
process re(quest) to give ‘‘sense to sensibility,’’ whilst simultaneously letting
‘‘sensibility guides the making of sense.’’
Since its conception more than three decades ago, the debate largely
extended in scope of actors involved and concerns addressed. Scientists
initiatives such as the Asilomar conferences and the governmentally
linked establishment of TA form the roots of the GMO debate. At
Asilomar, the safety of laboratory workers and their neighborhood was
questioned by the scientiﬁc community for the ﬁrst time, already ﬂavoring
the debate with an implicit ethical dimension. TA broadened the aspects
under study by evaluating the socio-economic impact on society of bio-
technology. It enlarged the spectrum of involved actors with traditional
(trade unions, employers organizations) and other social partners (envi-
ronmental and consumer organizations), and by taking the general public
or civil society into account. Biotechnology also captured the attention of
academics in environmental philosophy and ethics, who questioned the
moral acceptability of the interference of man with his natural environ-
ment.
The growing inﬂuence of private ﬁnancing and the commercialization of
genetic engineering, together with the institutionalization of the critical
questioning of science all inﬂuenced the scientiﬁc community. That scientiﬁc
academics became entrepreneurs or were ﬁnanced by private capital had
implications for their moral positions. With knowledge becoming a
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commodity for private proﬁt, questions arose about the patentability of
natural parts of life forms, and about the hybridization between funda-
mental and applied research. Hence, scientiﬁc objectives became intertwined
with extra-scientiﬁc (e.g., socio-economic/commercial) ones.
In the development of biotechnology from laboratory science to society,
the emergence of concerns explicitly labeled as ethical was associated to a
speciﬁc momentum: ‘‘ethics’’ explicitly entered the picture with the ﬁrst gene
therapy experiments on humans and with transgenic animals.
Transgenic crops and agro-food products, initially restricted to conﬁned
laboratories, gained presence in agricultural ﬁelds, in supply chains, on
shelves of supermarkets, and on consumers plates in the EU, thereby di-
rectly and physically entering the public sphere. The dynamics of this
intertwined ‘‘science-industry-public sphere’’ network received strong input
from successive and various incidents (such as food safety scandals), from
the failure of the government to anticipate and manage these incidents, from
the bold metaphorical and rhetorical discourses of both GMO proponents
and opponents, and from the growing public distrust. This led to the
gradual arousal of a ‘‘complex of concerns’’ that largely extended the initial
risk framing of the GMO issue. In this complex, any distinctions between
environmental, agricultural, and socio-economic issues proved to be blur-
red, fueling the confusion about the wider debate about genetic modiﬁcation
and the risk assessment of GM crops.
To improve public and market conﬁdence, the existing European regu-
latory frame on the commercialization of transgenic crops was deeply re-
vised during the de facto moratorium. The adoption of the precautionary
principle, post-market environmental monitoring, and traceability currently
is seen as a way to cope with scientiﬁc uncertainties; whilst labeling, trace-
ability, and co-existence provisions are attempts to take the demand of the
consumers and farmers choice seriously. Although attempts have been
made to democratize and pluralize expertise in decision-making, public
participation or ethical consultation has been shown to be at best symbolic.
Intrinsic moral concerns also prove to be a hard nut to crack in terms of
legal commitments, as the ethical question has been brought to the private/
individual sphere. Finally, a new challenge already presented itself: the
implementation of an integral sustainability evaluation. So far, however, it
seems that a risk-based policy is further solidiﬁed. As such, the (re)quest to
accommodate many societal concerns and diﬀering values at play in the
GMO debate continues to play with regard to the risk analysis of GM agro-
food products.
Also models on science communication went through a restyling in
order to cope with the skeptical and/or ambivalent public attitudes to-
wards agro-food biotechnology. After the deﬁcit approach that saw the
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solution in making lay people think more like scientists or risk experts
failed, the discourse gradually shifted from an emphasis on scientiﬁc lit-
eracy towards public engagement and participation. The latter explicitly
aims to cope with the non-scientiﬁc concerns lay people rely on when
perceiving risk. This trend towards a ‘‘rational orchestration’’ of the public
voice is conﬁrmed by the growing amount of consensus conferences and
citizen panels in science evaluating processes. Several observers have no-
ted, however, that these participatory events rarely allow the examination
of wider societal and ethical concerns, and are of secondary importance to
the much debated demand for a cultural change in key decision-making
and scientiﬁc institutions. It thus remains a huge challenge to take the
wide range of societal concerns seriously in both communication and
decision-making.
The complex of concerns and actors described in this paper is a
dynamically evolving complex. New studies are needed to understand how,
and in how far, the societal concerns discussed are at play today and how
much ‘‘ethics’’ is still an issue in biotechnology. Although ethics seems to
play less overtly in todays public sphere, one cannot conclude that in the
case of agro-food biotechnology ethics is dead. To the contrary, the lasting
skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food
biotechnology and the continued controversies about the commercializa-
tion of transgenic agro-food products are illustrative of an ongoing
legitimacy crisis. One could even interpret the stigma on agro-food bio-
technology and its products as testifying to a ‘‘robust’’ societal disap-
proval: it signals a lack of trust in scientiﬁc institutions and expert systems,
and voices a social response against the reduction of the complexity of the
GMO issue to a solely scientiﬁc risk-based problem. Hence, a move from a
merely scientiﬁc evaluation towards a socially more robust one – that
addresses precaution and socio-ethical issues in a more ‘‘sensible’’ way,
whilst making ‘‘sense’’ of the diﬀerent stances taken in the GMO debate –
is still sought for. As such, the (re)quest for Sense and Sensibility seems to
have been partially fulﬁlled (e.g., the restyled EU regulatory frame, par-
ticipatory initiatives), partially evaded (e.g., Gelassenheit), and partially
shifted towards new topics (e.g., co-existence, molecular farming, nano-
biotechnology, biofuels). It will be interesting to see whether new con-
troversies show (triggered, for example, by GMO contaminations or traces
of unapproved transgenic events in non-transgenic produces), how these
will be communicated and developed in the societal climate, and how they
will be interpreted and tackled by, and/or lead to new adjustments in the
now running legal system.
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